fix(cursor): trim #784 safety patch to marker-only on legacy stream-json path (closes #822) (#828)

* fix(cursor): drop timing heuristic from #784 intercept; scan raw payload (#801 follow-up)

PR #801 shipped a two-strategy intercept for the synthetic AskQuestion
skip response in legacy stream-json mode. Real-traffic data from a
post-merge run shows the marker-match strategy never fires (the
converter's `extractToolResult` discards the marker for tool shapes it
does not recognize, returning `{}`) and the timing-signature
defense-in-depth strategy fires only on false positives - notably the
Anthropic Vertex Claude tool calls cursor-agent surfaces in legacy
sessions, which all land as `name=unknown` with the `{}` extracted
result and frequently complete under the 500 ms threshold.

Measured on a single legacy-resumed session (`7b769423`): 1,136
`name=unknown` tool calls, 16 rewritten as `no_input_surface`, zero
actual marker strings stored anywhere in the session. The 16 rewrites
were legitimate fast tool calls (Anthropic Vertex `toolu_vrtx_*` IDs)
mischaracterized as fabricated skip responses.

Changes:
- Remove the timing-signature heuristic and its supporting state
  (started-at map, elapsed-ms calculation, latency threshold, test-only
  state reset).
- Move the marker scan from the post-`extractToolResult` output to the
  raw `tool_call` payload, so it can see the marker on stream-json
  shapes the converter does not specifically recognize. Function-shaped
  tools exclude `function.arguments` from the scan to avoid matching
  agent-controlled input. Other shapes scan the full payload (no
  agent-input field exists at the top level).
- Refresh tests: drop timing-based positive cases, add a marker-in-raw-
  payload positive case for `name=unknown` shapes, and add a regression
  that legitimate fast `name=unknown` tool calls without the marker
  pass through with `status: completed`.
- Document scope: this intercept now lives only on the legacy stream-
  json path, which only resumed pre-ACP sessions hit. New cursor remote
  sessions go through `cursorAcpBackend` and the `cursor/ask_question`
  ACP extension method (#799) - immune to this bug. The intercept
  drains with the legacy session population.

Tracking: #784. Builds on #801, complements #799.

* fix(cursor): exclude agent input from marker scan; surface top-level Anthropic tool names (Codex P2)

Codex flagged a false-positive case on the fork-stage review of this
branch (heavygee/hapi#35, P2): an Anthropic tool_use shape with a
top-level `name` (e.g. `{id, name: 'TodoWrite', input: { ... }}`) gets
labelled `name=unknown` by the converter and passes the AskQuestion
gate. If the agent's `input` quotes the synthetic-skip marker - which
happens whenever an agent edits or documents this very bug - the
intercept would rewrite a perfectly fine TodoWrite as a fabricated
skip.

Two-part fix:

1. `extractToolName` now reads the top-level `name` field as a final
   fallback. A real `TodoWrite` / `Bash` / `str_replace_based_edit_tool`
   surfaces with its actual name and is rejected by the AskQuestion
   gate before the marker scan runs. The original AskQuestion
   fabrication case still surfaces as `unknown` (per #784 issue body
   the name is stripped in the fabricated payload) and remains
   detectable.

2. Defense in depth: introduce `AGENT_INPUT_KEYS = {input, args,
   arguments}` and exclude these from the non-function shape's marker
   scan. Even if a tool reaches this code path with `name=unknown` and
   the marker buried in its `input`, the intercept won't fire on agent-
   controlled text.

Two new regression tests:

- Anthropic tool_use shape `{id, name: 'TodoWrite', input: {todos: [
  marker]}}` → passes through with `status: 'completed'`.
- `name=unknown` shape with marker only inside `input` → passes through
  with `status: 'completed'`.

All 20/20 tests pass; typecheck clean (cli + web + hub).
This commit is contained in:
HeavyGee
2026-06-08 13:30:04 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent cb72703649
commit 6d2d0d4707
3 changed files with 243 additions and 226 deletions
+6 -4
View File
@@ -48,13 +48,15 @@ Set mode via `--mode` flag or change from the web UI during a session.
- **Legacy sessions** - Cursor sessions created before the ACP migration can still resume temporarily via stream-json. Start a new Cursor session to get ACP permissions, plans, todos, and question support.
- **Session resume** - ACP sessions resume through `session/load`. Old stream-json `session_id` values are not loadable via ACP; those sessions keep using the legacy path until you start fresh.
### Headless safety: AskQuestion behavior
### Legacy stream-json safety: AskQuestion behavior
When running cursor-agent under `--print --output-format stream-json` (HAPI's current remote mode), the cursor-agent CLI returns a synthetic `Questions skipped by the user, continue with the information you already have` response for the `AskQuestion` tool because there is no IDE surface to render the question. The agent's underlying model can interpret this as legitimate user consent and act on it.
New cursor remote sessions go through ACP, which handles `AskQuestion` via the bidirectional `cursor/ask_question` extension method and is immune to the issue below. The intercept described here exists only for legacy sessions that resume via the older `agent -p` stream-json launcher.
HAPI intercepts this synthetic response in the stream-json event converter and rewrites it to an explicit `no_input_surface` error (`is_error: true`), so agents do not act on fabricated user consent. Defense-in-depth: any `AskQuestion` (or `name=unknown`) tool completion that arrives within ~500 ms of its start event with a trivial payload is treated the same way, in case cursor-agent changes the synthetic-string text in a future release.
When running cursor-agent under `--print --output-format stream-json`, the cursor-agent CLI returns a synthetic `Questions skipped by the user, continue with the information you already have` response for the `AskQuestion` tool because there is no IDE surface to render the question. The agent's underlying model can interpret this as legitimate user consent and act on it.
Agents running under HAPI's Cursor remote mode should fall back to plain-text prompting (markdown options + waiting for a regular user message) until the [ACP migration (tiann/hapi#781)](https://github.com/tiann/hapi/issues/781) lands and `cursor/ask_question` becomes available as a proper bidirectional ACP method. At that point this intercept becomes unnecessary and is removed.
HAPI's legacy event converter intercepts this synthetic response and rewrites it to an explicit `no_input_surface` error (`status: failed`), so downstream consumers (web UI, Telegram, log readers) surface the fabrication as an error instead of silently passing through fabricated consent. The intercept scans the raw `tool_call` payload for the literal marker text and is scoped to `AskQuestion`-shaped (and converter-fallback `name=unknown`) calls; legitimate read/write/function tools are not affected.
The intercept drains naturally with the legacy session population - resumed pre-ACP sessions are the only path that still hits this code.
Tracking issue: [tiann/hapi#784](https://github.com/tiann/hapi/issues/784).