Files
sub2api/backend/internal/pkg/ip/ip_test.go
T
shawandClaude 7c48f9a85f fix(security): unify audit log & session binding client IP with API key ACL trust toggle
Behind a reverse proxy (e.g. nginx with X-Real-IP), admin audit logs and
session IP/UA binding always recorded 127.0.0.1 because they hardcoded
the gin trusted_proxies chain, while API key IP restriction already
honored the "trust forwarded client IP" system setting.

- add ip.GetSecurityClientIP(c, trustForwarded) as the single source of
  truth for security-sensitive client IP selection; API key auth
  middlewares (main + google) refactored onto it with zero behavior change
- SessionBindingContext(cfg) now resolves the client IP via the same
  toggle and injects it into the request context; token issuance,
  binding enforcement and its mismatch audit record all read the
  injected value, so issue/verify can never diverge
- audit log middleware and audit-log clear trace record the same
  security client IP (middleware.SecurityClientIP), falling back to the
  trusted proxy chain when the injection is absent
- settings UI hint (zh/en) documents the broadened toggle scope and the
  one-time re-login after toggling while session binding is enabled

With the toggle off (default) behavior is byte-for-byte unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 09:33:18 +08:00

127 lines
3.6 KiB
Go

//go:build unit
package ip
import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestIsPrivateIP(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
ip string
expected bool
}{
// 私有 IPv4
{"10.x 私有地址", "10.0.0.1", true},
{"10.x 私有地址段末", "10.255.255.255", true},
{"172.16.x 私有地址", "172.16.0.1", true},
{"172.31.x 私有地址", "172.31.255.255", true},
{"192.168.x 私有地址", "192.168.1.1", true},
{"127.0.0.1 本地回环", "127.0.0.1", true},
{"127.x 回环段", "127.255.255.255", true},
// 公网 IPv4
{"8.8.8.8 公网 DNS", "8.8.8.8", false},
{"1.1.1.1 公网", "1.1.1.1", false},
{"172.15.255.255 非私有", "172.15.255.255", false},
{"172.32.0.0 非私有", "172.32.0.0", false},
{"11.0.0.1 公网", "11.0.0.1", false},
// IPv6
{"::1 IPv6 回环", "::1", true},
{"fc00:: IPv6 私有", "fc00::1", true},
{"fd00:: IPv6 私有", "fd00::1", true},
{"2001:db8::1 IPv6 公网", "2001:db8::1", false},
// 无效输入
{"空字符串", "", false},
{"非法字符串", "not-an-ip", false},
{"不完整 IP", "192.168", false},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := isPrivateIP(tc.ip)
require.Equal(t, tc.expected, got, "isPrivateIP(%q)", tc.ip)
})
}
}
func TestGetTrustedClientIPUsesGinClientIP(t *testing.T) {
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
r := gin.New()
require.NoError(t, r.SetTrustedProxies(nil))
r.GET("/t", func(c *gin.Context) {
c.String(200, GetTrustedClientIP(c))
})
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/t", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "9.9.9.9:12345"
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "1.2.3.4")
req.Header.Set("X-Real-IP", "1.2.3.4")
req.Header.Set("CF-Connecting-IP", "1.2.3.4")
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
require.Equal(t, 200, w.Code)
require.Equal(t, "9.9.9.9", w.Body.String())
}
func TestCheckIPRestrictionWithCompiledRules(t *testing.T) {
whitelist := CompileIPRules([]string{"10.0.0.0/8", "192.168.1.2"})
blacklist := CompileIPRules([]string{"10.1.1.1"})
allowed, reason := CheckIPRestrictionWithCompiledRules("10.2.3.4", whitelist, blacklist)
require.True(t, allowed)
require.Equal(t, "", reason)
allowed, reason = CheckIPRestrictionWithCompiledRules("10.1.1.1", whitelist, blacklist)
require.False(t, allowed)
require.Equal(t, "access denied", reason)
}
func TestCheckIPRestrictionWithCompiledRules_InvalidWhitelistStillDenies(t *testing.T) {
// 与旧实现保持一致:白名单有配置但全无效时,最终应拒绝访问。
invalidWhitelist := CompileIPRules([]string{"not-a-valid-pattern"})
allowed, reason := CheckIPRestrictionWithCompiledRules("8.8.8.8", invalidWhitelist, nil)
require.False(t, allowed)
require.Equal(t, "access denied", reason)
}
func TestGetSecurityClientIPHonorsTrustToggle(t *testing.T) {
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
trustForwarded bool
want string
}{
{name: "trust disabled uses trusted proxy chain", trustForwarded: false, want: "9.9.9.9"},
{name: "trust enabled uses forwarded header", trustForwarded: true, want: "1.2.3.4"},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
r := gin.New()
require.NoError(t, r.SetTrustedProxies(nil))
r.GET("/t", func(c *gin.Context) {
c.String(200, GetSecurityClientIP(c, tc.trustForwarded))
})
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/t", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "9.9.9.9:12345"
req.Header.Set("X-Real-IP", "1.2.3.4")
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
require.Equal(t, 200, w.Code)
require.Equal(t, tc.want, w.Body.String())
})
}
}