The CLI wraps array-content user messages as agent output because
isExternalUserMessage rejects non-string content. On the web side,
detect text-only arrays in non-sidechain user output and emit them as
role:'user' so they display in the user lane.
Also handle sidechain user messages with mixed array content (e.g.
tool_result + text) by extracting text parts into a sidechain block.
Closes#407's original scope on top of the #402 base.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-authored-by: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(web): drop "No response requested." assistant messages
When Claude Code injects system messages (task notifications, system
reminders) as user turns, Claude responds with "No response requested."
In the HAPI web UI this appears as a reply to the user's message,
making it look like Claude is ignoring their input.
Filter these out in isSkippableAgentContent() (catches the fallback
path in normalize.ts) and in normalizeAssistantOutput() (catches the
primary path). Both checks verify the assistant message contains only
the text "No response requested." with no tool calls.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(web): filter text block instead of dropping entire message
Address bot review: dropping the whole normalized record breaks
sidechain UUID threading (parentUUID chain orphans).
Instead of returning null, suppress only the "No response requested."
text block during content extraction. The message record (uuid,
parentUUID, usage) is preserved so the tracer's sidechain grouping
continues to work.
Also remove the isSkippableAgentContent check since we no longer
need to drop the message at that layer.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(web): move "No response requested." filter to reducer layer
Address bot review: filtering in normalizeAssistantOutput() produced
empty content arrays, breaking traceMessages() which reads uuid and
parentUUID from content[0]. Sidechain child messages whose parentUUID
pointed to the filtered message became orphaned.
Fix: revert the normalizer to always emit the text block (preserving
the UUID chain for the tracer), and filter the sentinel text in
reducerTimeline.ts where text blocks become visible AgentTextBlocks.
At this point tracing is already complete.
Also adds reducer-level tests for the filter and updates the
normalize test to verify the text block is preserved.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(web): scope sentinel filter to single-block assistant messages only
Address bot review: the previous filter suppressed any text block
matching "No response requested.", which could hide legitimate replies.
Now the filter only triggers when the message has exactly one content
block (msg.content.length === 1) — i.e., the assistant response is
purely the sentinel text with no tool calls or reasoning blocks.
This prevents false positives while still catching the system-injection
auto-reply case.
Add test for the multi-block case (text + tool call) to verify the
sentinel text is preserved when other content exists.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(web): add parentUUID structural check to sentinel filter
Address bot review: raw text match alone could theoretically suppress
a legitimate reply. Add c.parentUUID !== null as a structural guard:
- Sentinel auto-replies always follow a prior assistant turn, so their
parentUUID is set (pointing to the previous message in the chain).
- A first message in a conversation has parentUUID: null and will
never be filtered.
Combined conditions: msg.content.length === 1 (sole block, no tool
calls) AND c.parentUUID !== null (not the first reply) AND exact text
match.
Add tests for the parentUUID=null escape hatch.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(web): use injected-turn UUID tracking for sentinel filter
Address review: use structural markers instead of broad text matching.
1. Pre-scan collects UUIDs from sidechain content blocks (system-
injected user turns). The sentinel filter now only triggers when
parentUUID points to one of these known injected turns.
2. Move task-notification event extraction from normalizer to reducer.
Previously, task-notifications with summary were normalized as
role:'event', losing their uuid. Now they stay as sidechain (uuid
preserved for pre-scan), and the reducer extracts the summary as
an agent-event block.
3. Remove redundant 'uuid' in c guard (always present on sidechain type).
False positive analysis: a legitimate reply is only suppressed when ALL
of: (a) sole content block, (b) parentUUID matches a sidechain-injected
turn, (c) exact sentinel text. This combination cannot occur for real
user-facing content.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(web): add parentUUID to sidechain content type for tracer linkage
The sidechain content block was missing parentUUID, so traceMessages()
could not chain system-injected user turns (task notifications, system
reminders) inside a Task sidechain back to their parent. This caused
later sidechain messages pointing to the injected turn's UUID to become
orphaned and disappear from the Task card.
Add parentUUID to the sidechain type definition and propagate it from
normalizeUserOutput() in both the isSidechain and non-sidechain paths.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(web): handle array-content sidechain user messages to prevent prompt leak
Sidechain user messages can arrive with either string content or array
content ([{type:'text', text:'...'}]) depending on how Claude Code
serialises them. The previous fix only handled the string case, causing
intermittent prompt leaks when array format was used.
Now normalizeUserOutput extracts text from array-content sidechain
messages and emits them as sidechain blocks, so the tracer can match
them to their parent Task tool call.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* test(web): verify parentUUID propagation from assistant output data
Add integration tests confirming normalizeAssistantOutput correctly
maps data.parentUuid to text block parentUUID (used by the reducer's
sentinel detection). Tests cover both present and absent parentUuid.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
---------
Co-authored-by: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(cli): filter raw SSE event JSON from leaking into chat messages
Two types of internal JSON were appearing as visible text in Telegram
Mini App and web chat:
1. `rate_limit_event` — the rate limit parser returned `null` for
unknown statuses, causing raw JSON to pass through as assistant text.
Changed to `{ suppress: true }` so all rate_limit_event variants are
handled; new statuses that need display can be added explicitly.
2. `{ type: "output", data: { ... } }` — internal session metadata
envelopes leaked through the ACP text chunk pipeline. Added an
`isInternalEventJson` filter that catches JSON objects with known
internal envelope types (output, event, queue-operation) before they
enter the text buffer.
Closes#386
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(cli): narrow internal event filter to match only leaked metadata shape
Address review feedback: the broad type-based filter could suppress
legitimate assistant JSON with type "event" or "queue-operation".
Narrow the check to only match the specific leaked metadata envelope:
{ type: "output", data: { parentUuid, sessionId, userType } }
Add negative tests confirming other JSON types pass through.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(cli): suppress malformed rate_limit_event without resetsAt
Address review: rate_limit_event payloads missing resetsAt still leaked
as raw JSON because parseRateLimitText returned null before reaching the
unknown-status suppress. Move the allowed check before the resetsAt
guard and suppress malformed payloads instead of passing them through.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(cli): handle parentUuid: null in internal event filter
Root/first-message metadata envelopes have parentUuid: null rather than
a string, so the filter missed them. Accept both string and null.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* test(cli): add e2e regression tests for metadata envelope filtering
Add AcpMessageHandler tests that verify leaked { type: "output", data }
metadata envelopes (both parentUuid string and null) are dropped before
reaching the text buffer.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(cli): clear buffered prefix when cumulative metadata chunk arrives
When a leaked metadata envelope arrives as cumulative streaming chunks
(first an incomplete JSON prefix, then the full blob), the filter
dropped the full chunk but left the prefix in bufferedText. Clear the
buffer when the detected internal JSON starts with the buffered prefix.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(cli): round resetsAt to integer for pipe-delimited format
The web-side regex uses \d+ to parse the timestamp, so a float value
would silently fail to match. Apply Math.round to ensure integer output.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(cli): clear buffered prefix for cumulative rate_limit_event chunks
The prefix-clearing logic only applied to the isInternalEventJson
branch but not to the parseRateLimitText branch, so cumulative
rate_limit_event chunks could leave a raw JSON prefix in the buffer.
Hoist the prefix check before both filters and apply uniformly.
Add regression tests for suppressed and displayable cumulative
rate_limit_event scenarios.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
---------
Co-authored-by: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(cli): continue execution after plan mode in YOLO/bypassPermissions
In YOLO mode (bypassPermissions), exit_plan_mode was auto-approved like
any other tool, skipping the PLAN_FAKE_RESTART injection that tells the
agent to continue. Combined with isAborted() always returning true for
exit_plan_mode, claudeRemote exited the query loop and stalled waiting
for user input.
Fix: in the bypassPermissions branch of handleToolCall, intercept
exit_plan_mode specifically — inject PLAN_FAKE_RESTART into the message
queue and return deny with PLAN_FAKE_REJECT, matching the behavior of
the normal approval flow.
Closes#172
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* test(cli): remove unused isPlanTool helper
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
---------
Co-authored-by: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
The copy button was absolutely positioned (right-0 top-0) over the
entire message content area. When assistant messages contain both text
and tool calls (e.g. TodoWrite), the button overlapped the tool card UI.
Move the button from absolute positioning inside the content wrapper to
an inline flex layout after the content. This places it at the bottom-
right of the message, below all content (text + tool cards), so it never
overlaps anything. The hover-to-reveal behavior is preserved.
Also restores getAssistantCopyText to its original logic so mixed
text+tool messages remain copyable (the previous fix of suppressing the
button entirely for mixed messages was too aggressive).
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-authored-by: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
The release workflow produces `hapi-linux-x64-baseline.tar.gz` (from
bun-linux-x64-baseline target), but the Homebrew formula generator wrote
the URL as `hapi-linux-x64.tar.gz`, causing `brew install` to fail on
Linux x64 with a 404.
Closes#365
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-authored-by: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(hub): raise maxRequestBodySize so file uploads work
The Bun server inherited maxRequestBodySize from Socket.IO's default
maxHttpBufferSize (1 MB). The upload endpoint sends files as base64
in JSON, so any image > ~750 KB was silently rejected before reaching
the route handler. The frontend allows 50 MB uploads.
Raise the limit to at least 100 MB to accommodate 50 MB files with
base64 encoding overhead (~33%).
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(hub,web): fix file uploads — raise body limit, lower max size, show errors
Three changes:
1. hub/server.ts: Bun's maxRequestBodySize inherited Socket.IO's 1 MB
default, silently rejecting any upload. Raise to 10 MB.
2. hub/routes + web/attachmentAdapter: lower MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES from
50 MB to 5 MB (realistic for images; 5 MB base64 ≈ 6.7 MB body,
fits within the 10 MB server limit).
3. web/AttachmentItem: show "Upload failed" text and strike-through
filename on error, instead of just a tiny icon.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(hub): keep 50MB upload limit, size maxRequestBodySize to match
Bot review correctly flagged that lowering MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES to 5 MB
regresses the documented 50 MB limit. Revert to 50 MB and calculate
maxRequestBodySize properly: 50 MB × 4/3 (base64) + 1 MB (JSON
overhead) ≈ 68 MB.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
---------
Co-authored-by: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(web): reconnect SSE immediately when tab becomes visible
The SSE watchdog skips heartbeat checks while the tab is hidden. If the
connection dies in the background, the user sees stale messages after
switching back and has to wait up to 10 s for the next watchdog tick.
Add a visibilitychange listener that checks heartbeat staleness
immediately when the tab becomes visible and reconnects if stale.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(web): map visibility-recovery reason in reconnecting banner
The new 'visibility-recovery' reconnect reason was not mapped in
getReasonLabel(), so the raw string would appear in the UI banner.
Add localized labels for both en and zh-CN.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
---------
Co-authored-by: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(web): disable indented code blocks in markdown rendering
In CommonMark, text indented by 4+ spaces is treated as a code block.
LLM responses frequently have indented content inside numbered lists or
quoted text, causing large chunks to render as a single code block
instead of formatted markdown.
Add a remark plugin that disables the codeIndented tokenizer. Fenced
code blocks (``` … ```) continue to work normally.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(web): fix typecheck for remark plugin this binding
Use `as any` cast for the unified processor `this` context instead of
an explicit type annotation that conflicts with the Processor type.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(web): use this:unknown annotation to satisfy noImplicitThis
The previous `as any` cast on `this` still triggers noImplicitThis in
strict mode. Annotate the parameter as `this: unknown` and cast to
the required shape inside the function body. Also use the key-based
`data(key, value)` API instead of mutating the returned object.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
---------
Co-authored-by: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
The rename endpoint uses PATCH /api/sessions/:id, but the CORS
middleware only allowed GET, POST, DELETE, OPTIONS. Browsers send a
preflight OPTIONS request for PATCH; without it in allowMethods the
preflight fails and the request never reaches the handler, causing
"Failed to rename" in the web UI every time.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-authored-by: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(web): filter system-injected XML tags from rendering as raw text
Claude Code injects internal messages (<task-notification>, <system-reminder>,
<command-name>, <local-command-caveat>) as user-role messages. The web UI was
rendering these as raw XML text visible to users.
- Parse <task-notification> and display as agent-event with summary text
- Silently drop <system-reminder>, <command-name>, <local-command-caveat>
- Add tests covering all injection prefixes and edge cases
* fix(web): scope system injection filtering to Claude sessions only
Address review feedback: the XML tag filtering was applied at the
generic timeline layer, which could incorrectly hide legitimate user
messages in Codex/Gemini sessions.
- Add isClaudeSession flag threaded from Session.metadata.claudeSessionId
- Only filter system-injected tags when isClaudeSession is true
- Add tests verifying non-Claude sessions pass through all messages
* fix(web): treat all string user output as sidechain to prevent prompt leaks
Restores the fix from 3cf96ab that was accidentally reverted in 2205e04.
In normalizeUserOutput(), string-content user messages arriving through
the agent output path are never real user input (real user text goes
through normalizeUserRecord). Previously, non-sidechain string messages
were emitted as role:'user', causing subagent prompts and system-injected
messages to render as user text in the web UI.
Now all string-content user messages in this path are:
- <task-notification> with summary → converted to role:'event'
- Everything else → marked as sidechain (matched to parent Task tool
call by the tracer, or harmlessly skipped by the reducer)
This provides a root-level fix that prevents ANY string user message
from the agent output path from leaking as visible user text.
* ci: retrigger CI
* fix(web): remove superseded return-null filter from upstream PR #372
The upstream `return null` filter for <task-notification> and
<system-reminder> (from PR #372) is now superseded by the comprehensive
sidechain upgrade logic. Remove it to avoid short-circuiting the new
task-notification → event conversion.
* refactor(web): remove reducer-side system injection filtering
System-injected messages are now fully handled in normalizeUserOutput()
(normalize layer), so the redundant filtering in reduceTimeline() is no
longer needed. Removing it also eliminates the risk of accidentally
hiding legitimate user messages that happen to start with XML tags.
- Remove SYSTEM_INJECTION_PREFIXES, isSystemInjectedMessage,
parseTaskNotificationSummary from reducerTimeline.ts
- Remove isClaudeSession plumbing from reducer.ts and SessionChat.tsx
- Simplify reducerTimeline.test.ts to only test pass-through behavior
* feat(web): add copy button to user messages
Add a small copy button to user message bubbles for easy text copying,
especially useful on mobile where selecting text is difficult.
- Mobile: button always visible (opacity-60)
- Desktop: button appears on hover
- Uses existing useCopyToClipboard hook with haptic feedback
- Conditionally rendered to avoid empty container spacing
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
* fix(web): use valid CSS property in copy button transition
transition-[opacity,colors] is invalid because 'colors' is not a CSS
property (only Tailwind's utility class 'transition-colors' expands it).
Use 'background-color' instead so the hover background transition
actually works.
via [HAPI](https://hapi.run)
Co-Authored-By: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
---------
Co-authored-by: HAPI <noreply@hapi.run>
