PUT /api/v1/admin/settings is a whole-document write. The admin UI always sends
the complete document, so saving from the settings page is unaffected both
before and after this change. The bug is only reachable when an API client calls
the endpoint directly and sends just the fields it wants to change, which is the
natural assumption for a PUT on a settings resource.
Value-typed fields of UpdateSettingsRequest bind to their zero value when the
payload omits them, and buildSystemSettingsUpdates writes every key
unconditionally, so such a caller has no way to say "leave this one alone".
Omitting a field and explicitly clearing it are indistinguishable on the wire.
A caller that sends only the field it wants to change, e.g.
{"risk_control_enabled": true}
sets that flag and clears every other unguarded field in the same request.
Measured against a fully configured store, one such call empties site_name,
site_subtitle, api_base_url, contact_info and doc_url, and turns
registration_enabled, email_verify_enabled, invitation_code_enabled and
turnstile_enabled off. turnstile_enabled alone gates the captcha on login,
register, forgot-password and both verify-code endpoints, and
email_verify_enabled is a precondition of IsPasswordResetEnabled.
The damage is easy to miss. site_name has a built-in fallback, so
getStringOrDefault renders the cleared value as the default product name and the
login page visibly changes, while the toggles just go quiet. Reopening the
settings page reads the already-cleared state back into the form, so correcting
the one visible field and saving persists the rest of the damage.
Fields that grew their own guard already survive this: the SMTP block falls back
to the previous values when smtp_host arrives empty, secret fields are written
only when non-empty, and 132 request fields are pointers whose handler merges an
omitted field with the stored value. This generalizes that pattern rather than
adding a fourth ad-hoc guard.
The handler now decodes the payload a second time as a raw field map, resolves
the setting key each absent field would have written, and hands that set to the
service, which drops those keys before SetMultiple, so the stored value is never
touched. Fields the payload does carry are written as before, giving the caller
the partial-update semantics it was already assuming. The mapping is reflected off
the request's json tags so new fields are covered without maintaining a list;
smtp_from_email is the only field whose json name differs from its setting key
and is aliased explicitly.
Only value-typed fields are filtered. Pointer fields keep whole-document
behaviour on purpose: forwarded_client_ip_headers and
api_key_acl_trust_forwarded_ip depend on being rewritten on every save to
re-normalize fail-closed state, which the malformed forwarded-client-IP header
test pins down.
An explicitly sent empty value is still a deliberate clear; only absent fields
are preserved. A partial write refreshes the in-process caches from storage
instead of from the request struct, which holds zero values for whatever the
caller omitted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The composite-groups PR (#3581) replaced the raw ent SubscriptionPlan
response of GET /admin/payment/plans with a projection struct but
dropped the currency field added by #4323. PlanEditDialog then read an
undefined currency, sent an empty string on save, and silently wiped
the stored plan currency. Restore currency plus created_at/updated_at
so the projection preserves the full original response shape.
Persist reasoning ceilings and exact mappings for OpenAI groups, enforce them across HTTP and WebSocket forwarding, and invalidate cached auth snapshots.
The in-place update ran entirely inside c.Request.Context(). Browsers and
reverse proxies commonly abort long-idle requests (axios global timeout
30s, nginx proxy_read_timeout 60s by default), which canceled the request
context mid-download and killed every slow update with
'download failed: context canceled' while the version stayed unchanged.
Users behind slow GitHub links saw the update button fail at a wall-clock
ceiling (~60s) on every attempt (#4504).
- Run PerformUpdate and RollbackToVersion on a context detached from the
request (context.WithoutCancel) and bounded by a 15-minute deadline so
the 10-minute GitHub download client owns its own timeout. A client
disconnect no longer aborts the binary swap; retries then hit the
system operation lock or report 'Already up to date'.
- Raise the frontend timeout for the update/rollback calls from the
global 30s axios default to 15 minutes so the browser can actually
wait for the result.
Fixes#4504
Behind a reverse proxy (e.g. nginx with X-Real-IP), admin audit logs and
session IP/UA binding always recorded 127.0.0.1 because they hardcoded
the gin trusted_proxies chain, while API key IP restriction already
honored the "trust forwarded client IP" system setting.
- add ip.GetSecurityClientIP(c, trustForwarded) as the single source of
truth for security-sensitive client IP selection; API key auth
middlewares (main + google) refactored onto it with zero behavior change
- SessionBindingContext(cfg) now resolves the client IP via the same
toggle and injects it into the request context; token issuance,
binding enforcement and its mismatch audit record all read the
injected value, so issue/verify can never diverge
- audit log middleware and audit-log clear trace record the same
security client IP (middleware.SecurityClientIP), falling back to the
trusted proxy chain when the injection is absent
- settings UI hint (zh/en) documents the broadened toggle scope and the
one-time re-login after toggling while session binding is enabled
With the toggle off (default) behavior is byte-for-byte unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
PR #4425 was authored before #4429 widened NewUserHandler with the
step-up TOTP and user services, and merged without a rebase, breaking
typecheck on main.
Admins often recreate groups with the same pricing, routing, and account membership. A server-side duplicate creates an inactive copy for review, preserves eligible account priorities, and recovers ambiguous retries without creating extra groups.
Constraint: Group has no neutral JSON metadata field for durable operation recovery
Constraint: Model routing references account IDs, so copied configuration requires matching bindings
Rejected: Rebuild from the list response | it omits configuration and account priority details
Rejected: Store operation identity in business configuration | it would pollute real group settings
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep duplicated groups inactive until an administrator reviews the copied configuration
Tested: Go unit and full tests, go vet, integration-tag compile, frontend Vitest, lint, typecheck, production build, and Playwright duplicate flow
Not-tested: PostgreSQL container integration locally because Docker is unavailable; CI will execute the database-backed suite
Admins often recreate monitors with the same endpoint, model, and request settings. A server-side duplicate keeps the stored API key out of the browser, creates a disabled copy for review, and uses stable operation identity to recover ambiguous retries without creating extra rows.
Constraint: Stored monitor API keys must never be returned to the browser
Constraint: Applying a request template must preserve internal duplicate recovery metadata
Rejected: Rebuild the monitor from list data | list responses only contain a masked API key
Rejected: Copy runtime state and history | a duplicate should start as an unverified configuration
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep duplicated monitors disabled until an administrator reviews and enables them
Tested: Go unit tests for repository, service, and admin handler; integration-tag compile; go vet; golangci-lint v2.9; frontend Vitest, ESLint, typecheck, production build; Playwright duplicate flow
Not-tested: PostgreSQL container integration locally because Docker is unavailable; CI will execute the database-backed suite
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