PR #5423 relaxed the email suffix whitelist: once a whitelist is
configured, non-whitelisted registrable domains are each allowed to
register one account. That behavior activated unconditionally.
Add registration_email_domain_quota_enabled (default false) to gate it:
- Off (default): restore pre-#5423 strict whitelist semantics — with a
non-empty whitelist, non-whitelisted domains are rejected with
EMAIL_SUFFIX_NOT_ALLOWED; the register/verify views restore the
client-side whitelist pre-check and allowed-domain hint.
- On: keep #5423 behavior — one account per non-whitelisted registrable
domain (EMAIL_DOMAIN_REGISTRATION_LIMIT).
- Empty whitelist keeps allowing all domains in both states.
Gating lives in validateRegistrationEmailQuota and (as a race-safety
backstop) createUserWithRegistrationEmailGuard; the repository-level
domain lock + in-tx recheck is unchanged. The admin update field is
*bool (omitted = keep current) so stale full-payload saves cannot
silently flip the switch. Email binding and OAuth auto-signup keep
their strict policy, and pending-OAuth bind-login for existing
accounts is unaffected because the handler resolves existing emails
before the quota check.
Frontend adds the toggle to admin settings (zh/en copy; whitelist hint
restored to strict wording, quota wording moved to the new toggle) and
exposes the flag via public settings + SSR injection payload.
Tests: #5423 quota tests now enable the switch explicitly; new
default-off regression tests cover register/send-code/async/pending
OAuth/OIDC create-account plus both register views; API contract JSON
and the injection drift guard are updated.
Resolves three conflicts, all of the "both branches appended to the same
block" shape. Every one is resolved as a union of both sides; nothing from
either parent is dropped.
- handler/admin/setting_handler_update.go: keep ChannelMonitorHideThroughput
(V2) alongside GrokDefaultTextModel / GrokCrossClientModelMapEnabled /
GrokDefaultBaseURLMode (#5408). UpdateSettings writes every key on each
save, so dropping either side would reset those settings to zero values.
- service/domain_constants.go: keep SettingKeyChannelMonitorHideThroughput
and the three SettingKeyGrok* constants.
- repository/migrations_runner.go: keep the 195 checksum rule (V2) and the
218/219/220 rules (#5408).
Fix golangci unused/gofmt on the gentle-backfill path. Plot matrix and
line-chart X axes on the selected [requested_start, requested_end)
window (empty slots while backfill lags), and let plain mouse-wheel zoom
narrow the visible interval so pulse blocks grow wider.
Review follow-ups on the reset-credit caching flow:
- Recover account state BEFORE (and independently of) the reset-credit
display cache. A failed cache refresh could previously abort the run and
leave the account rate-limited — the very reason the credit was spent
(#3672 / #3740). The recovered account row is now returned even when the
cache refresh fails.
- Run the post-reset bookkeeping on a detached, time-boxed context and give
the panel reset call a larger timeout. A client abort no longer strands a
consumed (non-refundable) credit with an unrecovered account, and the
chained upstream calls can no longer exceed the client timeout and invite a
retry that spends a second credit.
- Persist the reset-credit snapshot through POST /accounts/:id/quota/refresh
instead of a side-effecting GET flag, so the write is covered by the audit
middleware. A rejected snapshot write now degrades to cache_persisted=false
instead of turning a successful upstream read into a 502 that left the card
without a credit count and the reset button permanently disabled.
- Reject snapshots whose positive count carries no expiration entries, and
drop expired credits (clamping the count) when rehydrating, so a stale
cache can no longer light up the reset button.
- Keep nil quota / rate-limit services nil in the handler's interface fields;
storing a nil *Service made the "not enabled" guards non-nil.
- Time-box the usage-refresh suppression and reuse handleAccountUpdated so the
patched row also enters the auto-refresh silent window.
Implements #2646: the risk-control content audit can now send OpenAI
Moderations requests through a proxy from IP Management - Proxy Servers.
Backend:
- ContentModerationConfig gains proxy_id (nil = direct, unchanged default)
- update semantics: null keeps, 0 clears, >0 selects (validated to exist)
- moderation calls build the client via the shared httpclient pool; proxy
resolution failure surfaces as a moderation error and never silently
falls back to direct connection
- proxy_id -> URL resolution cached 60s (single-entry, invalidated on
config save) so the pre-block hot path does not hit the DB per request
- test-key endpoint accepts proxy_id too (null = saved config's proxy,
0 = force direct), so input-key/saved-key tests exercise the same path
- proxy usage/inactivity logged (content_moderation.proxy_enabled /
proxy_not_active) without leaking credentials
Frontend:
- ProxySelector in the risk-control basic settings tab, proxy list loaded
non-blockingly; save and test payloads carry proxy_id; zh/en i18n
- Add compact_home_enabled setting to provide a minimal landing page
- Preserves custom home_content priority over compact mode
- Renders only site identity, navigation, and login/dashboard link
- Avoids marketing copy that triggers anti-fraud systems
- Includes focused backend/frontend tests and i18n support
Fixes#5065
A hijacked session must not be able to silently add a passkey as a
persistent backdoor or remove the victim's credentials. Registration
(begin) and deletion now verify the account password server-side,
reusing the existing PASSWORD_REQUIRED / PASSWORD_INCORRECT errors.
The password is used instead of TOTP step-up so the guard also protects
deployments that never configured a TOTP encryption key. The password
key in both request bodies is covered by the audit middleware's
key-substring redaction, so no credential material reaches audit_logs.
Frontend: the add-passkey form gains a current-password field, and the
delete confirmation is now a dialog with a password input (replacing
window.confirm), mirroring the TOTP disable dialog. Backend error
messages (e.g. wrong password) are surfaced instead of the generic
failure toast. Rename remains password-free as it is cosmetic.
feeeei